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Introduction

The Arab Spring of 2011 came as a surprise to most observers. What were once reasonably tranquil societies
exploded in anti-government protests in the span of a few weeks. Such sudden, massive changes in anti-authority
sentiment are hardly unique in history. In the 20th century alone, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917, and the fall of Iron Curtain and Soviet governments were all similarly as sudden and as

1

massive as the Arab Spring protests.

The frequency with which such events occur suggests that they are

not idiosyncratic. This begs two questions: i) What are the mechanisms through which such massive changes
arise?, and ii) Are there institutional or macroeconomic conditions that encourage such changes when present
and discourage such changes when absent?
There is an extensive literature answering the rst of these questions. Granovetter (1978) was amongst the
rst to argue that

cascades

can arise when individuals' preferences are interconnected - if enough people take

some action it encourages others to do the same, which encourages more to do the same, and so on until a
cascade results in a vastly dierent equilibrium. Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b) proposed a related mechanism,
noting that small events can encourage individuals to publicly reveal their previously suppressed, privately held
preferences; if a threshold level of preference revelation is passed, a cascade to a new equilibrium can arise.

2

These models have been employed to explain numerous phenomena, including the rapidly escalating protest
movements that arose in many Communist countries in Eastern Europe around the fall of Communism (Kuran
1991, 1995a; Lohmann 1994).

3

Cascade models dier signicantly from the neo-classical view of collective action put forth by Olson (1971)
and Tullock (1971, 1987), where individuals maximize their own utility independent of others. The interconnectedness of preferences inherent to cascade models entails very dierent consequences from neo-classical models;

1 Historically,

numerous other examples abound. This is no place for a complete list, but some examples include the Taiping

Rebellion in China (1850-1864), the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381, and even the Protestant Reformation. The latter spread
anti-papal sentiment in a manner unseen in previous Christian history (as most other movements were quickly repressed). Indeed,
Rubin (2014) suggests that the mechanism proposed in the present paper played a key role in the Reformation, as the printing
press facilitated the spread of the "shock" of Luther's initial works, leading to a cascade of revolt.

2 Small

events can also act as a signal in the decision process, leading to social learning phenomena such as herd behavior that

encourages individuals to ignore their private information and follow the actions of others. These insights were rst spelled out
theoretically by Banerjee (1992, 1993) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) - who argued that herding could result in
inecient and fragile equilibria - and conrmed in the lab by Anderson and Holt (1997). Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer,
and Ivo Welch have organized a website, http://info-cascades.ivo-welch.info/, which provides a literature review and links, as of
2004, to articles on information cascades.

3 Experimental

work has given further insight into the nature of cascades. For example, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) show that

cascades can fail to emerge when predicted by theory due to limited reasoning ability. Goeree et al. (2007) show that cascades can
self-correct, leading to dierent predictions than standard models. Others have delved into the theoretical determinants of cascades.
Kuran and Sunstein (1999) argue that the availability of certain types of information - and the ability of some to manipulate which
information is available - pushes societies towards certain equilibria. Oliver et al. (1985) and Yin (1998) stress the importance
of the distributions of the production function and preferences in determining whether a revolution occurs.

Watts and Dodds

(2007) argue that cascades are driven by a critical mass of easily inuenced people, and Macy (1991) argues that protest thresholds
are endogenous.

Oliver (1993) provides an overview of the sociological advances made in this literature in the 1980s and early

1990s. The present paper abstracts from these points by presenting a model with parsimonious and non-controversial assumptions
regarding distributions, player types, and preference exogeneity.

1

the latter indicate that collective action is dicult to sustain in large groups, whereas it follows from the former
that large-scale collective action can occur even in the absence of supporting organizations. The fact that the
historical record points to numerous instances of large-scale collective action suggests that the cascade literature
oers insight where the neo-classical model fails.
Yet, despite the existence of such an extensive literature on cascades, there is precious little theory addressing
the second question asked in the opening paragraph: Are there

institutional or macroeconomic conditions

that

4 The works
facilitate the formation of cascades when present and discourage their formation when absent?
which do study such institutional conditions focus primarily on the role that social or political sanctions play in
suppressing private opposition to a regime (Kuran 1989, 1995a; Lohmann 1994; Rasler 1996; Slater 2009). By
merely focusing on the political structures in which such phenomena arise, it is possible to overlook the general
microeconomic settings under which these behaviors are facilitated.
This paper aims to ll this hole in the literature. To this end, I formulate a general model which applies to
all types of sanctioning authority (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). The model's insights extend
on the works cited above, suggesting that cascades which induce massive economic, social, or political changes
may be a consequence of an institutional arrangement in which one type of authority has multilateral coercive
power - that is, the ability to aect sanctions over numerous dimensions (religious, social, economic, etc.). I
call this authority a

central authority,

with the degree of centralization increasing in the authority's (implicit)

5 On one extreme, a fully centralized regime is akin to

ability to impose multiple sanctions on the citizenry.

a totalitarian system, where the ruler has total domination over all aspects of life (Arendt 1951). The other
extreme is a well-functioning democracy, where rulers are subject to a variety of checks and balances and have
little authority over most parts of one's life. The model analyzes both of these extremes - which rarely exist in
their purest form in the real world - as well as departures from either extreme and the resulting consequences

6

thereof.

Specically, the model analyzes the interactions between citizens and institutional authorities under the
situation where their preferences are not aligned. Citizens derive intrinsic utility from their own actions and
have sanctions imposed on them for publicly rejecting (i.e., protesting) the actions of the two institutional

4 Ellis

and Fender (2011) consider the role that information cascades play in revolutionary regime transition, but they model the

two phenomena separately instead of integrating the two. Callander (2007) shows how bandwagons can arise in sequential voting
schemes, such as U.S. presidential primaries, but does not explore more general institutional conditions.

5 Throughout

this paper, I use the term "centralized" to indicate the degree to which coercive power over sanctions aecting

dierent aspects of one's life (e.g., political, religious, social) is concentrated in one authority.

This is similar to the structure

recently proposed by Slater (2009), who looks at the role that the separation between political elites and communal/religious elites
plays in revolution mobilization. This is a broader denition than ones normally used in the political science and political economy
literature, which frequently focus on federalism, administrative centralization, scal centralization, or democratic centralization (for
example, see Rondinelli [1981] or Manor [1999]). Any of these forms of centralization t into the model espoused in this paper,
although my focus is the costs imposed by authorities, not the institutional structures themselves.

6I

thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that the model is akin to a perfect competition model; while it rarely exists in

the real world, it provides a nice framework for analyzing departures from the extreme case.

2

authorities.

These actions could represent any number of phenomena in which the desires of some citizens

diverge from those of institutional authorities, such as speaking or writing freely, having more than one child, or
practicing a minority religion. Citizens' utilities are also interdependent with other citizens (as in Granovetter
1978; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Kuran 1995; Kim and Bearman
1997; Siegel 2009). That is, citizens derive disutility when their actions dier from endogenously determined

7

social norms.

The model's dynamics entail that there are two equilibria of concern (as in Granovetter 1978 and Kuran
1995a): a low protest equilibrium and a massive protest equilibrium.

8 The model's primary insight is that

the size of the shock necessary to jump from one equilibrium to the other is a

function of the type of regime.

More specically, the model suggests that highly-centralized authorities are more insulated from pressures for
change when exogenous shocks are small. There is less incentive for citizens to violate the dictates of highlycentralized authorities, as they incur more than one type of sanction from doing so. Consequently, the tipping
point of the cascade is not reached, and those who privately share feelings of opposition to the authority do
not protest (and implicitly punish those who do). As a result, the low protest equilibrium is more likely to
remain after a small shock.
Yet, since citizens in a highly-centralized regime are more likely to stay silent (i.e., not protest), massive
changes are more likely to result (relative to decentralized regimes) when a suciently large shock occurs. When
a small portion of society transgresses the law (or norm, or custom, etc.), a cascade to a vastly new equilibrium
arises; the actions of these citizens encourage more citizens to transgress the law, which encourages even more to
evade the law, and so on. This occurs to a lesser extent when authority is decentralized, as authorities are more
likely to accommodate the actions of the citizenry, and preferences are therefore less likely to be falsied prior
to the shock. Hence institutional authorities with centralized, multi-lateral coercive power may
from upheaval when in fact they are quite vulnerable.

seem

insulated

9

7 These norms may arise from the importance individuals place on social identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000,

2005), social custom

and reputation (Akerlof 1980; Romer 1984; Kuran 1989, 1998; Naylor 1990; Gould 1993; Kuran and Sunstein 1999), or status and
conformity (Fershtman and Weiss 1993; Bernheim 1994; Fershtman, Murphy, and Weiss 1996; Akerlof 1997; Kuran and Sandholm
2008).

8 The

term massive protest could be seen as synonymous with revolution, although the aim of this paper is to shed light on

any type of massive and rapid equilibrium change. Yet, this paper does relate to the large economic, sociological, and political
science literature in revolutions. The mechanism underlying revolutionary activity in the present paper is closest to Kuran (1989,
1995a, 1995b), who analyzes the implications of public revelations of private preferences. The present paper is not meant to accept
or deny the validity of any of the arguments in the revolutions literature, but instead oers a complementary hypothesis. I do not
account for the organizations or leadership that are often instrumental to revolutionary activity (or even civil war, as in Besley and
Persson [2011]), but instead provide a mapping from broad institutional structure to massive social, political, and economic change.
For overviews of the social analysis of revolutions, see Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), Shugart (1989), and Goldstone (1994, 2001).

9 An

additional implication of the model is that ineciencies are less likely to be addressed in centralized societies, since central

authorities do not have to compete with other authorities for constituents and revenue, and they are better able to suppress dissent
resulting from government ineciencies. Indeed, Hayek (1979) notes that the monopoly of the provision of government services held
by centralized governments causes economic ineciencies and restrictions of freedom that would not be found if more decentralized
entities were forced to compete for constituents. With respect to the model presented here, the upshot is that highly-centralized
authorities are eventually likely to disappoint their constituents, possibly resulting in a cascade. I do not consider this potentially

3

A familiar illustration of these dynamics has transpired in Korea since its partition in 1945. North Korea
became one of the most highly centralized regimes in the world (per the denition used in this paper), as
sanctioning power of all types was ostensibly held by the Supreme Leader (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and
Kim Jong-un).

Meanwhile, South Korea is signicantly more decentralized, and there is consequently much

more political conict (as is the case with most democracies). The conict in South Korea has led to numerous
marginal changes - particularly, expanded freedoms and democratization - as dierent ideologies and preferences
rose and fell in popularity with the population. The North Korean government has been able to prevent such
marginal changes from arising.

However, an implication of the model is that if the North Korean regime

eventually cracks, the institutional changes will be far larger than anything that has ever occurred in South
Korea.

10 The same could be said about the the Communist Party in China, Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe,

and the autocratic Arab dictators (e.g., Mubarak, Qadda) who faced major protests in the Arab Spring of

11

2011 (although none of these states are as centralized as North Korea).

Although the examples listed above are all of repressive regimes, this is only one way in which the centralization of coercive power is manifested. That is, repressive regimes - most of whom derive their ability to repress
through a stranglehold on the military - are a mere subset of the centralized regimes considered in the model. An
important example of a dierent type of regime to which the model applies is theocracy, where authorities have
inuence over religious sanctions. A contemporary example of such a polity is Iran, where political, economic,
and religious power is centralized in the religious establishment. It is costly for political or economic leaders
to openly violate the dictates of religious authorities, which implicitly gives the religious authorities power over
numerous types of sanctions. The model indicates that if a large shock ever occurs in Iran (perhaps a sharp
and unexpected drop in the price of oil), a massive institutional change may result.
In Section 3 of this paper, I provide an empirical test of the model by analyzing the numerous austerity
protests which occurred in the developing world since the 1970s.

These protests provide a nice setting in

which to test the implications of the model, since they were unexpected, varied in severity, generally occurred
after a specic type of shock (IMF conditionality), and occurred in dierent types of regimes (centralized and
decentralized). An econometric analysis of these protests from 1976-1992 is consistent with the implications of
endogenous nature of the shock in the model, however, as doing so would complicate the model without yielding much additional
insight, since the results would merely be exacerbated.

10 I

thank an anonymous referee for pointing out how well the Korean example ts the intuition espoused in the model.

The

most obvious examples are of political institutions in unstable countries, but the mechanisms of the model can also apply within
stable countries. Although these countries generally do not have "centralized" governments in the context employed in this paper
(i.e., control over numerous aspects of one's life), there are generally lower-level institutions in these countries to which the model
applies. For example, religious sects often control numerous aspects of members' lives and thus help shape their publicly-expressed
opinions. The model suggests that the long-run vitality of these groups will be undermined if leaders express opinions which are
too far out of line with members' privately held opinions (e.g., on gay marriage or abortion).

11 Indeed,

none of the Arab Spring states fully controlled the religious establishment, which left an important lever of control

out of their hands. Likewise, a certain level of decentralization of economic institutions has occurred in China over recent decades.
Despite the government's attempts to censor inammatory material, the spread of the internet and social networking websites like
Weibo has made complete centralization nearly impossible.

4

the model. The main result is that protests were more severe under decentralized authorities if they followed
small shocks, but were more severe under centralized authorities if they followed large shocks.

2

The Model

2.1

Setup

Consider a
large):

M

T

period game, for some large

T,

with perfect information. There are

M +2

players (where

M

is

heterogeneous citizens and two institutional (social, political, economic, legal, or religious) authorities

12 An example of such a setting is a dictatorship

- a central authority (C ) and a non-central authority (N ).

where the central authority is the dictator and the non-central authority is a tribal leader, religious leader,
major landowner, celebrity, judge, local political ocial, or anyone else whose actions inuence the utility of
the citizens yet are themselves subject to the actions of the dictator.
The institutional authorities choose from a continuous set of actions which the citizens can publicly accept
or reject. The model analyzes situations in which the preferences of some citizens exogenously dier from those
of the authorities, so actions could represent varying levels of freedom of speech, press, or religion, publicly
expressed dissatisfaction with the government or religious authorities, or public opinion on social issues. The
questions that the model sheds light on are, "Under what conditions do small shocks lead to a massive increase
in protest by citizens?" and "How is the severity of protest aected by the centralization of authority?"
In the rst period, the central authority chooses an action
central authority chooses an action
accept (aj

= 0)

or reject (aj

N

a

= 1) C 's

∈ [0, 1].
action.

From periods

aC ∈ [0, 1].
3

to

T,

In the second period, the non-

citizens choose whether to publicly

They make this decision once in each period and they do so

simultaneously. Citizens are not bound to make the same decision in every period. A citizen who chooses to
reject (aj

= 1)

in period

In some period
in period

t̄ − 1

τ

may choose to accept (aj

T
2

t̄ ∈ (3, )),

C

in period

in period

τ + 1.

an exogenous shock is realized where fraction

are encouraged to choose

to accept or reject

= 0)

t̄.

aj = 1

in period

t̄.

β ∈ (0, 1)

of those choosing

aj = 0

Meanwhile, all other citizens simultaneously choose

The game continues as before until actions are chosen in the nal period

T.

The shock can be interpreted as an unexpected and unforeseen event which momentarily reduces the perceived costs or increases the benets of publicly rejecting

C.

Historical examples of such a shock include the

self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi (which ignited the Arab Spring of 2011), Martin Luther nailing the 95
Theses to the door of a Wittenberg church (sparking the Protestant Reformation), or the failed attempt of royal
ocial to collect poll taxes sparking the English Peasant's Revolt of 1381.

In all of these (and many other)

cases, the shock aected only part of the population, who publicly displayed their displeasure simply because

12 The

inclusion of only two authorities allows for tractability. The intuition underlying the main results of the model holds in

more realistic situations including numerous types of authorities.

5

they were displeased, not because they intended to ignite a cascade. The changes resulting from these shocks
were only later transmitted to the rest of the population (through mechanisms highlighted in this model).
Each citizen

j

aj = 0

dictates if

derives utility from choosing actions,
and rejects them if

aj = 1.

aj ∈ {0, 1},

13

where the citizen publicly accepts

Citizens derive greater utility from rejecting

C 's

C 's

dictates when

14 Each citizen is randomly assigned a bliss point
their own intrinsic "bliss point", bj , is further away from zero.
from a normal distribution with mean

µ

and variance

σ 2 .15

The citizens' utilities are interdependent; that is,

16 Citizens observe how many other citizens

they derive more utility by choosing actions that others choose.
rejected

C

(chose

aj = 1)

in the previous period, and they derive utility by acting in a manner similar to how

others acted in the previous period. This underscores the idea that attending a protest is much more enticing
if many others have protested in the past, but one does not know how large a protest will be in the present.
If the citizens choose to publicly reject the authorities' dictates, they also incur costs which are a function of
the actions of the institutional authorities,

aC

and

aN .

These costs are increasing in the size of the violation (as

in Romer [1984], Iannaccone [1988], Bernheim [1994], Kuran [1987, 1995a], Akerlof [1997], Kuran and Sandholm
[2008]) and represent the costs (or punishments) associated with publicly breaking a religious dictate, breaking
a law, violating a political norm, and the like, depending on the type of authority in question.
Citizen

j 's

preferences in period t are described in each period by the following utility function:

I {aj,t
where

h
i
P
2
Uj,t = I {aj,t = 0} −m1 (aj,t − bj ) + m2 M1−1
I {ai,t−1 = 0} +
h

i ,
P
2
= 1} −m1 (aj,t − bj ) + m2 M1−1
I {ai,t−1 = 1} − m3 aj,t − aN − m4 aj,t − aC

m1 , m2 , m3 ,

and

m4

The non-central authority,

C , not N .

Instead,

actions contrary to

13 The

N

are weighting parameters greater than zero and

N,

I {·}

desires.

is an indicator function.

is not directly aected by the actions of the citizenry - citizens revolt against

weighs the intrinsic benets of its action against the costs that

C 's

(1)

N

C

can impose for choosing

can therefore be thought of as a legitimizing agent of

C

(e.g., a religious

literature on revolutions provides numerous other types of shocks that could precipitate revolutions, such as sharp

reversals in economic fortunes (Davies 1962; Tanter and Midlarsky 1967), rapid economic growth (Olson 1963), defeat in war, or
sustained population growth (Goldstone 2001). In some cases, the type of policies taken by centralized governments exacerbate
shocks to a greater extent than non-centralized governments (for a recent example, see Meng, Qian, and Yared [2010]; for more on
centralization and distribution of public goods, see Lockwood [2002], Besley and Coate [2003], and Faguet [2004]). Where this is
the case, the implications of the model for centralized governments are even greater.

14 I

assume that citizens derive no additional utility from a "successful" revolt (i.e., one where many citizens choose

aj = 1),

as

in Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011). Incorporating this into the model would merely exacerbate the incidence of cascades, since it
would lower the protest threshold level of each citizen.

15 Normality

is not a necessary feature of the analysis. Any type of distribution with two inection points provides similar results.

If there is a rightward skew in the distribution (which is to be expected, since there is a fatter tail of citizens in opposition to the
central authority in most oppressive regimes), then the results hold over a larger portion of the parameter space than is considered
in this paper.

16 Interdependence

captures the inuence of social norms which may arise from the importance individuals place on social iden-

tity, social custom, reputation, status, or conformity. This specication assumes that individuals derive utility from conforming.
Gintis (2003) suggests that "pro-social" behavior may be biologically determined, as humans improved their biological "tness" by
internalizing cultural norms. Also see Greif (2010) and Greif and Tadelis (2010).
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authority legitimizing an autocrat or a legal authority legitimizing elected ocials).
For simplicity, I assume that the actions of the citizenry do not enter
do aect the citizenry, and the citizens' actions indirectly aect

C

assumption is justied if we consider the cost imposed by

utility from choosing actions close to its intrinsic bliss point,
which dier from the central authority,

C.

N 's

While

N 's actions

utility (through their eect on

N 's

actions.

C ),

N

this

derives

∈ (0, µ), and it faces a cost from choosing actions
µ

indicates that it has a stronger preference for

preferences can be described as follows:

UtN = −n1 bN − aN
n1

N 's utility function.

as the salient one aecting

N

The upper bound

no protests occurring than the average citizen.

where

b

N 's

17

2

is a weighting parameter greater than zero.

− γ aN − aC

γ≥0

2

,

(2)

is the primary exogenous parameter of concern

in the model. It denotes the degree to which the non-central authority incurs a cost from diverging from the

18 Although there are certainly endogenous elements to

action of the central authority.

γ

in reality - the degree

to which one authority incurs costs from diverging from the other could be a function of the degree to which the
citizens abide by its dictates - endogenizing this key variable unnecessarily complicates the model. This paper
concentrates on massive equilibrium changes over a short period and how such changes arise rapidly. Broader
institutional changes which endogenously eect the level of centralization may follow in the long run due to the
interactions described in the model, but should not be aected in the short run by the rapid, massive change

19

which is at the heart of this model.

The centralization parameter enters
action dierent from

γ ∈ (0, ∞)
that

C

C.

At

γ = 0,

N 's

utility as a scalar which aects the cost

there is no such cost, at

there is a positive cost that is increasing in

may also face costs from not conforming to

γ.

γ→∞

N

incurs for choosing an

there is an innite cost (if

aN 6= aC ),

and at

While it is possible (in reality, but not in the model)

N , the assumption of unidirectional centralization of coercive

20 It follows from this setup that at
power allows for tractability.

γ → ∞,

the two authorities are ostensibly the

same actor: power over numerous dimensions is centralized in one authority (C ). This extreme case is similar
to Arendt's (1951) vision of totalitarianism, where rulers have total domination of all aspects of life. At large

γ

less than innity,

C

has signicant but not unlimited power over varying types of sanctions.

The central authority,
upper bound

bN

C,

derives utility from choosing actions close to its bliss point,

bC ∈ 0, bN
N. C

indicates that it has a stronger preference for no protests occurring than

17 For more on the economic eects of legitimizing agents, see Co³gel, Miceli, and Rubin (2012).
18 For more on the centralization of coercive power, see Greif (2005) and Karaman (2009).
19 Moreover, Rubin (2011) shows in a similar model that under a basic set of circumstances, endogenizing



. The

wishes to

the degree of central-

ization merely exacerbates the eects seen under an exogenous parametrization, as the feedback between players is more enhanced.

20 In

fact, the model can be interpreted as one of relative centralization, where

actions relative to the reverse situation (where
cost than

C

γ

is the cost incurred by

N

for not following

incurs costs). All that is needed for the results to hold is for

C.

7

N

C 's

to have a greater

minimize the average number of citizens who reject its dictates in period

T .21

This specication reects the

22

idea that the central authority wants to minimize the scale of public rejection of its policy.

C 's

preferences

can be described as follows:

U C = −c1 aC − bC
where

2.2

c1

2

−

1 X
I {ai,T = 1} ,
M

(3)

is a weighting parameter greater than zero.

Solving the Model

2.2.1 Equilibrium Actions: Citizens and

N

The model is solved using the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept, so I proceed using backwards induction.
Equilibrium actions are denoted with superscript *.
I rst solve for the equilibrium actions of the citizenry in periods
equation (1) indicates that citizen

j

chooses to publicly accept

C 's

3

through

T.

A little algebra applied to

dictates in period

t (aj,t = 0)

when:





X


2
1 
m1 − m2 1 −
I {ai,t−1 = 0}) + m3 1 − aN ∗ + m4 1 − aC∗  .
bj ≤
2m1
M −1

(4)

i6=j

In each period, some citizen has the largest bliss point, denoted
an interior solution exists, then citizen
and standard deviation

σ

2

bj ≤

j

chooses

aj,t = 0

b∗t ,

aj,t = 0.

If

as the normal cdf with mean

µ

of all of the citizens choosing

when (denoting

F (·)

):




m2
1 
F b∗t−1 +
m1 − m2 + m3 1 − aN ∗ + m4 1 − aC∗ .
m1
2m1

Next, solve for the optimal action of

N

in period

aN ∗ =
Plugging (6) into (5) entails that citizen

j

2.

(5)

Its rst-order condition provides the result:

n1 bN + γaC *
.
n1 + γ

chooses

aj,t = 0

(6)

in period

t

when:

"
#
 



n 1 1 − bN
m2
1
γ
∗
C∗
bj ≤
F bt−1 +
m1 − m2 + m3
+ m3
+ m4 1 − a
.
m1
2m1
n1 + γ
n1 + γ
21 This

is an indirect utility specication. We could think of

in power while also having some optimal policy (bC ).

C 's

optimization problem as maximizing the probability of staying

Minimizing the number of citizens choosing

aj,T = 1

is tantamount to

maximizing the probability of staying in power.

22 If

there is a massive rejection of

C 's

policy, it will be reected by period

8

(7)

T.

See the rest of the model for details.

2.2.2 Stationary and Stable Equilibria
In this section, I consider stationary and stable equilibria of the game for a given level of

aC∗ .

I start by dening

the terms stationary equilibrium and stable equilibrium.

Denition

1: An equilibrium is

Denition

2: A stationary equilibrium is

period

t + 1,

stationary in period t if b∗t = b∗t−1 .
stable in period t if, after one citizen mistakenly changes actions in

the same stationary equilibrium in period

t

By denition, a stationary equilibrium arises when

b∗t = b∗t−1 ,

aj,t = 0

t − 1.

period

t,

in period

t

as choose

aj,t−1 = 0

in period

exists in some period

meaning that the same number of people choose

It follows that, if a stationary equilibrium exists in

then all citizens choose the same action in every period from

t

to

T

(in the absence of a shock).

∗
In a stationary equilibrium, all citizens with bliss points bt and below choose

b∗t

citizens with bliss points greater than
inequality (7) is satised for all

bj ≤

choose

aj,t = 1.

t

aj,t = 0

in period

bj > b∗t .

For large

M,

b∗t

while all

this logic indicates that

when:

"
#
 

N


n
1
−
b
m
1
γ
1
2
b∗t =
+ m3
+ m4 1 − aC∗ .
F b∗t−1 +
m1 − m2 + m3
m1
2m1
n1 + γ
n1 + γ
Figure 1 maps

t,

It follows that a stationary equilibrium exists when

b∗t but is not satised for all

an equilibrium is stationary in period

t◦ ∈ (t + 1, T ].23

(the highest bliss point of all citizens choosing

aj,t = 0)

(8)

on the horizontal axis and the

right-hand side of Equation (8) on the vertical axis (in a manner similar to Granovetter [1978] and Kuran
[1995]). This gure therefore provides insight into where a stationary equilibrium occurs: wherever the curve
crosses the 45-degree line, the left-hand side and right-hand side of Equation (8) are equal and hence represent
a stationary equilibrium.
The curve takes on the familiar S-shape because the distribution of bliss points is normally distributed, and
the cumulative density function,

F (·),

is found in the right-hand side of Equation (8). Normality means that

b∗

F (·)

increases slowly for low values of

F (·)

(which is located at the mean bliss point), and then tapers o as

(at the left tail of the pdf ), rises rapidly near the inection point of

b∗

increases (the right tail of the pdf ).

The S-shaped curve in Figure 1 has many important features. Most importantly, it indicates the possibility
that

multiple

stationary equilibria exist. When the curve crosses the 45-degree line more than once - which is

possible only when the slope of the curve is greater than one at its inection point (bliss point

µ)

- multiple

stationary equilibria exist. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that the three stationary equilibria (E1, E2, and E3) have

23 Citizens

cannot make mistakes in the model.

situations that are mistake-proof.
is slightly stricter.

The stable equilibrium concept is merely employed to focus our attention on

The stable equilibrium concept is similar to the trembling-hand perfect concept, although it

A stable equilibrium is not trembling-hand perfect because a "mistake" by one citizen could be oset by a

"mistake" by another citizen in a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, but not in a stable equilibrium.

9

dierent properties. E3 is a "good" stationary equilibrium from the central authority's perspective, since more
citizens choose

aj = 0,

while E1 is a "bad" stationary equilibrium.

For the remainder of the analysis, assume that multiple equilibria exist and that the pre-shock stationary
equilibrium is E3.

24 That is, prior to period t̄, the citizen with bliss point b is the one with the highest bliss
3

point amongst those choosing

aj,t = 0.

After all, we are interested in situations where massive anti-authority

movements emerge on what were quiet streets. We can interpret E3 as the "quiet streets" equilibrium, since
most of the population publicly accepts

C 's dictates despite privately disagreeing with C , while we can interpret

E1 as the "massive protest" equilibrium.
E1 and E3 are

stable

while E2 is not.

To see this, note that any point in which the curve is above the

45-degree line, such as bliss point Y in Figure 1, is one in which LHS<RHS of (8). Inequality (7) indicates that
for citizens with bliss point between Y and

b3 ,

the optimal action is

Y cannot have the largest bliss point of all citizens choosing

aj,t = 0

aj,t = 0 in period t, citizens with bliss points between Y and b3
t + 1.

aj,t = 0.

Hence, the citizen with bliss point

in a stationary equilibrium; if it chooses

also have incentive to choose

This means that at equilibrium E3, if one (or a few) citizens deviates and chooses

aj,t = 1, the equilibrium

will converge back to E3 in time. Conversely, this means that at equilibrium E2, if even
and chooses

aj,t = 0,

aj,t+1 = 0 in period

one

citizen deviates

the equilibrium will move to E3. Likewise, at any point in which the curve is below the

45-degree line, such as bliss point X, LHS>RHS of (8). Inequality (7) indicates that at any bliss point between

b1

aj,t = 1.

and X, the optimal action is

citizen deviates from E1 to choose

A similar logic to that espoused above indicates that if one (or a few)

aj,t = 0,

means that at equilibrium E2, if even

one

the equilibrium will converge back to E1 over time. Conversely, this
citizen deviates and chooses

aj,t = 1,

the equilibrium will move to

E1 in time. This logic entails that equilibria E1 and E3 are stable. On the other hand, since it only takes one
citizen deviating from E2 for a new equilibrium to emerge, E2 is not stable.
We are interested in nding the conditions under which the shock moves the economy from stable equilibrium
E3 to stable equilibrium E1. When this occurs, the society moves from the "quiet streets" equilibrium to the
"massive protest" equilibrium. It can be seen in Figure 1 that at equilibrium E3, if all of the citizens (plus one)
with bliss points between
(aj,t

= 1)

b2

b3

change their actions from public acceptance (aj,t

= 0)

to public rejection

of the central authority, E1 will emerge as the equilibrium outcome. All of the citizens with bliss

points between

b1

and

b2

join the cascade to the new equilibrium. In other words,

- if citizens below bliss point

24 Multiple

and

b2

choose

equilibria can only exist when

µ

aj,t = 1,

b2

is the

threshold

bliss point

E1 will eventually emerge as a stable equilibrium, while E3 will

is not too small. If

µ

is too small, the S-shaped curve arches upward prior to reaching

the 45-degree line, and it crosses the 45-degree line only once (at the top of the S). A sucient set of conditions for there to exist

m1 +m3 +m4
and σ < σ̄ , which can be found by plugging in F (µ) = 0.5, γ → ∞, and aC∗ = 0 into equation
2m1
and aC∗ are chosen to provide sucient conditions). When µ satises this condition, the S-shaped curve

three equilibria are

µ>

(8) (the values for

γ

intersects the 45-degree line at E1, and there must exist some
for all

σ < σ̄

(since a smaller value of

σ

σ̄

so that the curve also intersects the 45-degree line at E2 and E3

indicates a steeper S-shaped curve around the mean).
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re-emerge if citizens above

b2

choose

aj,t = 0.

Within the context of the model, this means that the shock may not end up aecting equilibrium actions at
all. If the pre-shock equilibrium is E3 and
the shock (i.e., choose

aj,t = 1)

β < F (b3 )−F (b2 ), then not enough citizens publicly disapprove after

to eventually move the equilibrium to E1. Instead, the equilibrium eventually

moves back to E3, and all those who were aected by the shock go back to publicly accepting
(aj,t

= 0).

C 's

dictates

This is tantamount to some people taking to the streets following a shock, but upon doing so realize

that public support for their cause is trivial, and they eventually go back inside and publicly abide by
dictates. On the other hand, when the shock is suciently large (β

> F (b3 ) − F (b2 )),

C 's

the initial equilibrium

unravels and the post-shock equilibrium is E1. In this case, enough people take to the streets after the shock
that more people are encouraged to do so (since preferences are interconnected), which encourages more to do
so, and so on until

1 − F (b1 )

portion of the citizens publicly reject

C.

2.2.3 Cascades and Centralization
In the model, there are two ways in which an economy can move from stable equilibrium E3 to E1 after a
shock. First, if nearly all citizens are aected by the shock (β is large), then most citizens publicly protest and
eventually E1 arises. This is a trivial result - it merely indicates that a large shock which encourages nearly
everyone to change actions will change the equilibrium outcome.

The second manner in which an economy

moves from E3 to E1 is less obvious. It occurs when cascades of public dissent encourage individuals to reveal
their preferences (in period

t)

after seeing others do so (in period

t − 1).

Cascades can arise when a small

portion of the population is aected by the shock because the interconnectedness of preferences spreads the
shock to much of the population. I focus on these outcomes for the rest of the paper; that is, I focus on cases of
preference

revelation

rather than preference

change.

After all, it is under these conditions that seemingly quiet

25

streets can erupt in protest after relatively small events trigger the spread of dissent.

I ignore the possibility that one citizen, knowing that they are the threshold citizen, triggers a movement
from E3 to E1.

26 Instead, I focus on the case where any one citizen or group of citizens is willing to publicly

display their anti-authority preferences

even if no one follows.

A recent and vivid example of such an action

was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor whose very public actions helped
spark the Arab Spring of 2011. He undoubtedly could not have foreseen the eect that his actions would have;

25 Of

course, in reality both preference change and preference revelation occur simultaneously. I focus on preference revelation

because changes resulting purely from preference changes are trivial (i.e., large preference changes leading to large changes in
equilibrium outcomes is not a novel insight).

26 This

makes sense under any number of realistic assumptions on cognition and population size (M ). This assumption merely

implies that even if citizens have full information on the distribution of types (which is extremely unlikely in reality), they do not
have the cognitive ability to calculate
a

group

b∗ .

This assumption is made to allow the model to address the more realistic situation where

of protestors creates a movement from E3 to E1, not an

individual

protestor. Indeed, how likely is it that anyone would

actually believe "if I protest, this movement will change from 25 people to 2,500 people"?

11

he was simply fed up with government conscations of his wares. Hence, the model focuses on decentralized
equilibrium changes, not those intentionally triggered by individuals or organizations (if this is even possible).
It also diers a bit from other models of cascades (e.g., Granovetter 1978; Lohmann 1994; Kuran 1995; Ellis
and Fender 2011) in which people extract

information

from the previous, public actions of others.

In those

models, people infer something about other people's preferences by their actions, which in turn augments their
own preferences and can lead to an information cascade. The present model is simpler (and more mechanical),
assuming that people simply respond to the publicly-expressed actions of others (perhaps due to social identity,
reputation, or conformity; see footnote 7 for citations).

Indeed, introducing information extraction into the

model would exacerbate its results, since information is all the more repressed in centralized regimes (and
hence, the information revelation mechanism is more eective in triggering a cascade).
In order to focus on cascades of preference revelation, I dene a cascade as occurring when more people who

not

are

directly aected by the shock switch actions (from public acceptance to rejection) than those who are

directly aected by the shock. Using the nomenclature from Figure 1, I formally dene a cascade as follows:

Denition
1.

3: A

cascade occurs if both of the following conditions hold:

F (b3 ) − F (b2 ) < β :

More than the threshold number of citizens change their actions after the shock,

entailing that the stable equilibrium changes from E3 to E1.

2.

F (b3 ) − F (b2 ) < F (b2 ) − F (b1 ):

The shock directly aects less than half of the citizens (who change their

actions after the shock) but still precipitates an equilibrium change from E3 to E1.

The main purpose of the model is to highlight the relationship between centralization and cascades. To this

C∗

end, note from (8) that changes in the centralization parameter (γ ) or the central authority's action (a
merely shift the curve in Figure 1. The curve shifts down as

a

C∗

N

<b

aC∗

increases and shifts up as

γ

)

increases (since

27 Hence, the rst question that the model answers is "under which conditions (with respect to
).

γ)

does a 'good' equilibrium (E3) emerge after the shock?"
Consider the following intuition. In high-γ economies, citizens falsify their preferences to a greater extent.
Hence, fewer citizens publicly reject

C

(choose

aj,t = 1)

since preferences are interconnected. This entails that

the bliss point of the "threshold citizen" (b2 in Figure 1) is further away from

b3

as

γ

increases, and a greater

shock is necessary to pass the threshold. Therefore, the range of shock sizes (β ) over which the economy returns
to the pre-shock stable equilibrium (E3) at some point after the shock is weakly increasing in centralization (γ ),
as noted in Proposition 1.

27 Since

it is assumed that there are 3 equilibria for all values of

aC∗ ,

the analysis does not focus on

C 's

decision.

chooses some aC∗ to balance the marginal deviation from its bliss point with the marginal increase in citizens choosing

C 's

choice is monotonic in

γ,

so we do not need to explicitly solve for it to attain comparative statics.
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C simply
aj,t = 0.

Proposition

1: The parameter space over which the pre-shock stable equilibrium (E3) eventually re-emerges

after the shock is weakly increasing in

γ,

ceteris paribus.

This result indicates that highly centralized economies are more insulated against public rejection of the central
authority.

However, in the event that a shock does trigger a cascade, it is worth asking: how

severe

is the

change in the stable equilibrium actions after the shock? The following denition is useful in formalizing this
analysis:

Denition
C

4: The

cascade magnitude is the number of citizens who change actions from publicly accepting

in a stable equilibrium prior to the shock to publicly rejecting

Cascades only arise when most citizens "disagree" with

C.

C

in a stable equilibrium after the shock.

I focus on this case (µ

> µ∗

for some

µ∗

dened

in the proof of Proposition 2), which often arises in autocratic regimes when the interests of the autocrat and
the citizens are not aligned. Indeed, it is in these situations where massive equilibrium changes occur; when
a cascade occurs in a regime where the citizens disagree with the central authority, the change in expressed
preferences is much greater than in a regime where most citizens agree with the central authority.
It was noted in Proposition 1 that centralized authorities are better able to suppress dissent and are thus
more insulated from small shocks.

Since centralized authorities can impose multiple sanctions on dissent,

citizens are less likely to publicly reject

C despite

disagreeing with its dictate. This enables a situation where

citizens "falsify their preferences" to a greater degree in centralized regimes. That is, citizens under centralized
rule are more likely to disagree with

C

but not publicly reject

C.

Kuran (1995a, p.

3) denes preference

falsication as "the act of misrepresenting one's genuine wants under perceived social pressures." When citizens
falsify their preferences, they choose actions which dier from their bliss point for two reasons. First, perceived
social pressures encourage them to choose actions similar to those chosen by others. Secondly, this outcome is
exacerbated when institutional sanctions are severe (m3 and

m4

are large) and the actions of the authorities

diverge from the bliss point of the citizenry.
The major upshot of increased preference falsication is that if a suciently large shock occurs (i.e., one
that is large enough that at least the threshold citizen changes actions), the cascade magnitude is larger the
more centralized the regime is. Once some citizens act closer to their internal preferences by publicly rejecting

aj = 1),

C , especially

C

(choosing

C

in the rst place. Since there are more citizens who privately disagree with

others will nd it more attractive to publicly reject

C

since they disagreed with

in centralized regimes, this

information revelation mechanism is stronger. This logic is summarized in Proposition 2.

Proposition

2: If a cascade arises, the cascade magnitude is weakly increasing in

When the citizens' bliss points are far away from the actions of

γ,

ceteris paribus.

C (µ is large, as it is in this case), larger cascades

occur under highly centralized rule following shocks. Although highly centralized authorities are more insulated
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from small shocks, citizens are relatively unhappy. This means that when a shock is large enough that some
citizens publicly reject

C , and so on.

C , the cost of publicly rejecting C

decreases, encouraging more citizens to publicly reject

Relative to the pre-shock stable equilibrium - which may often seem tranquil - centralized regimes

are subject to massive changes in public opinion despite having the appearance of public acceptance.

2.3

Discussion: Why Seemingly Tranquil Societies Implode

The intuition formalized in Proposition 2 oers two explanations for why

seemingly

tranquil, centralized soci-

eties can quickly undergo massive changes, especially when the centralized authority promotes policies that are
detrimental to most citizens (µ diers substantially from

aC ).

One explanation, which is also oered by Gra-

novetter (1978) and Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b), is that preference falsication encourages latent movements
in social norms to emerge after a shock. That is, an economic, political, or social shock may move equilibrium
actions by enough to encourage most citizens, even those who are not directly aected by the shock, to choose
drastically dierent actions.
The other explanation, which is novel to this paper, sheds light on the role that institutional structures
play in determining the eects of shocks. It suggests that a high degree of centralization discourages marginal
changes to equilibrium actions after small shocks. Citizens have less incentive to publicly dissent, as they incur
multiple institutional costs from doing so. The same citizens may be more encouraged to publicly dissent in
less centralized societies, however, as they face less cost from doing so. This is why, as Proposition 1 notes,
stable equilibria where there is little public dissent (E3) are more likely to re-emerge over time in highly
centralized economies following a shock.

Yet, when larger shocks materialize, large cascades towards vastly

dierent equilibria are more likely to result in highly centralized economies. This occurs because citizens falsify
their preferences to a greater extent in such economies, and thus large shocks encourage some citizens to change
their actions, in turn making it more likely that the institutional laws will be much dierent in the post-shock
equilibrium.
Kuran (1995a, 1995b) and Yin (1998) do suggest that unanticipated regime change is more likely to occur in
politically repressive countries. Their hypotheses coincide with the one made in the present paper, though it is
not clear that their hypotheses hold when other types of freedoms (religious, economic, legal) exist in politically
repressive regimes.

The essential dierence between the present hypothesis and Kuran's and Yin's is that I

stress the interdependence of institutions that are able to impose dierent types of sanctions. This leads to a
similar conclusion as Kuran and Yin, as such institutional structures are often found in politically repressive
regimes.
The model also provides insight for how central authorities can attempt to quash massive protest movements
before a cascade arises, although such strategic considerations are not explicitly modeled.
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While a typical

response of autocrats is to capture and execute the leaders of a protest movement, the model suggests that an
alternative strategy is to destroy a slice of the distribution of the citizenry, and this slice does not even need to

28 By jailing or executing a suciently large slice of the population, the authority can

be the most extreme slice.

break the chain of the cascade and prevent the good equilibrium (E3) from completely unraveling. In reality,
this can be very dicult for a central authority to accomplish, in large part because he has little information
on where people fall in the distribution of preferences. Instead, a more appealing (and less costly) mechanism
often employed by central authorities is to suppress information - both about the shock and about the ensuing
public disapproval. This can explain, for example, the extreme measures taken to suppress the internet in Iran

29 Such tactics work well to suppress small shocks. However, this also works to further push the

and China.

actions of the citizenry away from their intrinsic preferences, which may eventually cause a larger cascade and
thus unintentionally sow the seeds of the authority's demise.
In sum, the following testable predictions arise from this framework:

•

Stable equilibria where little public dissent exists are more likely to arise in highly centralized economies.

•

If a shock is large enough to cause a cascade, the change in pre- and post-shock stable equilibrium actions
is greater the greater the degree of centralization.

3

Austerity Riots and Centralization

A primary implication of the model is that countries with centralized authorities are more insulated from
change when shocks are small but are more susceptible to sudden, massive changes when shocks are large.
In this section, I test this implication by analyzing the severity of austerity protests in the developing world
between 1976 and 1992.

Such protests were common in the developing world beginning in the mid-1970s in

reaction to measures employed - almost always as a condition of IMF aid - to combat ination and government

30 I test the relationship between a series of IMF pressure variables and severity of protests over diering

debt.

degrees of institutional centralization to shed light on the relationships espoused in the model. Although the
data cannot speak to the microeconomic mechanisms highlighted in the model (namely, those related to internal
and expressed preferences and cascades), it can shed light on the connections between macroeconomic events,
institutional structures, and changes in publicly expressed opinions. This analysis underscores the determinants
of protest severity (a macro concept) as well as sudden equilibrium changes (a micro concept), since the latter

28 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this implication of the
29 Makowsky and Rubin (2013) employ an agent-based model to analyze

model.
the eects of institutional centralization and information

and communication technology (ICT) on protest thresholds. They nd that the two are complements - societies with centralized
institutions are more likely to experience revolutions when ICT is widely available.

30 The

evolution of IMF conditionality, as well as arguments for and against conditionality, are summarized in Dreher (2004,

2009).
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is realized in the former.
Modern austerity protests began in the mid-1970s, with the rst one occurring in Peru in 1976. The protests
were sparked by austerity measures which were almost always imposed by the IMF as a condition of assistance.
Thus, unlike previous price and food riots that occurred from time to time in world history, these protests
were targeted at internationally prescribed policies increasingly imposed by the IMF beginning in the mid-

31 The stated aims of these measures were freeing up markets and cutting government spending in order

1970s.

to reduce government debt and curb massive ination. These market-based measures, known by some as shock
treatment, included currency devaluation, broad reduction of spending on the public sector, privatization of
state-owned corporations, cuts in public subsidies for food and basic necessities, wage restraints, higher interest
rates, and elimination of protectionism (Walton and Seddon 1994).

32

These policies sparked protests in many places where they were imposed.

Such protests were dened by

Walton and Seddon (1994) as "large scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes,
and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization implemented in response
to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies." The international agency most associated
with these protests is the IMF, and hence Joseph Stiglitz called them IMF riots.
The shock treatment imposed by IMF conditionality presents a shock akin to the one described in
the model.

These were

not

slowly implemented policy adjustments that the public anticipated for a long

time. Instead, Walton and Seddon (1994) describe them as drastic, overnight price hikes resulting from the
termination of public subsidies on basic goods and services, proclaimed by the government as regrettably
necessary reforms urged by the IMF and international lenders as conditions for new and renegotiated loans.
These shocks generally occurred rapidly enough that, in terms of the model, the fraction of citizens protesting
before the shock,

F b∗t̄−1



, was not endogenous to the shock itself. Instead, a number of citizens, likely those

most harmed by the shock, incurred a temporary adjustment of their preferences, and in some cases this
adjustment was large enough to encourage them to protest.

33

The distributional implications of these policies are clear - most policies negatively aected the urban poor,
at least in the short run (Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 1994). The protests were primarily urban
in nature, often following a rise in a price for a specic good or an elimination of a subsidy.

In some cases,

the protests were relegated to one city and remained non-violent, such as organized strikes planned in Ecuador
and Bolivia (Walton and Ragin 1990). On the other extreme, protests turned into deadly riots which spread
throughout the country, as was the case of the Venezuelan protest of 1989, where a week of rioting spread from

31 Indeed,

the extended facility fund, which was established to assist debtor nations, was formed in 1974. This helps explain why

there were no austerity protests of this nature prior to the mid-1970s.

32 For a scathing review of these policies in the developing world over the last half-century, see Klein (2007).
33 In other words, the shocks generally occurred rapidly enough that the curve in Figure 1 did not shift, since

the right-hand side

of equation (8) is unaltered. The left-hand side of equation (8) does change, however, resulting in a movement along the curve.
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Caracas to 16 other cities.
What determined the dierences in severity of these protests? This topic has received some attention from
sociologists and political scientists, who have proposed a wide range of explanations. Walton and Seddon (1994)
and Walton and Ragin (1990) provide evidence that over-urbanization (that is, a high level of urbanization
relative to the level of economic development) plays a key role in both the presence and severity of the riots.

34

They suggest that the linkage between the two lies in the development of organizational infrastructure capable
of mobilizing political action. Walton and Ragin (1990) also suggest that IMF pressure signicantly aected
protest severity but ination and debt did not.

35

In this section, I analyze how changes in IMF involvement aected the likelihood of severe protest in a
country. When IMF pressure is present, pressures to liberalize markets generally ensue and protests may follow.
Propositions 1 and 2 of the model suggest that since austerity measures dier substantially from the bliss
point of most citizens (µ is much dierent that

aC ),

when IMF pressure (the shock in the model) is small,

centralized economies will better be able to suppress protests. However, signicant IMF pressure is more likely
to precipitate massive changes in centralized economies. In other words, the following prediction arises from
the model:

Prediction

1: When there is a small amount of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be less severe in

countries with more centralized institutions, all else being equal. However, when there is a large amount
of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be more severe in countries with more centralized
institutions.

3.1

Data

Data were gathered on austerity protests covering the same years as Walton and Seddon (1994): 1976-1992.
The former date denotes the onset of the rst modern austerity protest while the latter represents the time in
which Walton and Seddon went to press.
As noted by Walton and Ragin (1990), obtaining a complete list of debtor countries that experienced
international pressure to implement austerity measures can only be done indirectly, as the exact terms negotiated

36 To this end, I employ three measures identied by Walton

between the IMF and debtor countries is kept secret.

and Ragin as indicative of IMF pressure: 1) the country employed the extended fund facility (EFF), generally

34 Walton

and Ragin (1990) measure over-urbanization as follows: in cross-national studies of the degree to which less developed

countries are excessively urbanized, the usual practice is to regress level of urbanization on GNP per capita and use the residuals
as a measure of overurbanization ... Large positive residuals indicate that a country is excessively urbanized relative to its level of
economic development.

35 On

the other hand, Auvinen (1997) nds that poor economic performance (indicated by high ination and large debt service)

is associated with political demonstrations, riots, and strikes.

36 Of

course, the terms will not be kept secret forever. When they are made public, a better test of the model's implications can

be conducted.
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reserved for countries suering a signicant imbalance of payments relating to structural maladjustments in

37 2) the country's ratio of IMF

production and trade (IMF [various]), in a given year between 1976 and 1992;

funds used to its IMF quota exceeded 125% in a given year between 1976 and 1992; 3) the country rescheduled

38

or renegotiated its debt in a given year between 1976 and 1992.

70 countries satised one of these three

39 I form a panel that is restricted to years in which one of these criteria were
criteria between 1976 and 1992.
satised in the country in question within one year (either before or after). A list of these countries and the
years employed in the data is available in Appendix Table A1.
40 countries in the data experienced austerity protests between 1976 and 1992. A Lexis-Nexis search of news
reports of the 70 countries listed in Table A1 (as well as any listed in Walton and Seddon [1994] that were not
in Table A1) from 1976-1992 produced 116 separate instances of austerity protest. Protests and riots were

only

documented if they resulted from austerity measures or IMF pressure - other types of anti-government protests
or strikes are not included in the data. Planned general strikes and small, non-violent, sector-specic strikes are
also not included in the data (even if they resulted from austerity measures).

40

I subjectively coded each of these protests by severity using the following criterion, which are discussed
further in Appendix B. An instance was scored 1 if it were a small (relative to population), conned (to one
or two cities) protest. An instance was scored 2 if it were either prolonged but conned or widespread but not
prolonged and 3 if the protest were prolonged and contained widespread riots. An example of a protest coded
3 occurred in Algeria in October 1988, when 159 protesters were killed in a few major Algerian cities over the
span of week and thousands were injured and arrested. The government's response to the protests, including
those which lead to deaths, was

not

taken into account when creating the severity measures. Where government

action occurred, the index takes into account the reported events that the government was responding to, not
the government response itself. The reason for this is that it is possible that centralized governments are more
likely to respond with violence. Hence, including the government's response would bias the severity index in
favor of the proposed hypothesis.

37 The

IMF denes the extended fund facility as an IMF lending facility established in 1974 to assist member countries in

overcoming balance of payments problems that stem largely from structural problems and require a longer period of adjustment
than is possible under a Stand-By Arrangement. A member requesting an Extended Arrangement outlines its objectives and policies
for the whole period of the arrangement (typically three years) and presents a detailed statement each year of the policies and
measures it plans to pursue over the next 12 months. (IMF)

38 Walton

and Ragin split the last category into two: debt rescheduling and debt renegotiation. My reading of the data suggests

that the line between these two is often blurred, so I have lumped them together. Data for EFF and IMF quota comes from various
IMF Annual Reports; data for IMF funds used comes from the World Development Indicators database; data for debt rescheduling
and restructuring comes from clubdeparis.org, Kuhn and Guzmàn (1990), and Dillon et al. (1985).

39 Some

countries were omitted from the data set due to lack of IMF or control data. These include: Angola, Barbados, Burma,

Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Western Samoa, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Iran and South Korea
did not satisfy any of these conditions but are included in the data since there was an austerity protest in each country.

40 All

results are robust to inclusion of general strikes and industry-specic protests as severity 1 protests.

These results are

available in the Appendix. General strikes are not included in the base results because the model is intended to analyze changes in
individual behavior (on a collective scale) resulting from shocks, not organized, institutionally-driven protests.

18

A reading of the articles reporting on the protests showed that most protests/riots easily t into one of
these three categories. The dierences between protests coded 1 and other protests are especially stark. The
dierence between protests coded 2 and 3 are less obvious and thus more subjective, but this is not an issue in
the analysis, since protests of these two severity levels are always lumped together. I also create an alternative
index, found in Appendix B, for protests in which the severity level was not obvious. Table 1 shows the protests
data broken down by continent.

41

The intuition outlined in the model indicates that a good proxy for institutional centralization is one that
accounts for one authority's ability to aect numerous types of sanctions. One such variable is spelled out in
the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2008): constraint on the executive. This variable is dened as:

The extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives,
whether individuals or collectivities.

Such limitations may be imposed by any accountability

groups. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups
are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the
military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.

This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling Unlimited Authority (no regular limitations on the executive's
actions) and 7 equaling 'Executive Parity or Subordination (accountability groups have eective authority equal
to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity). This variable provides an ideal proxy for the degree
of institutional centralization, as spelled out in the model, because it measures the degree to which political
authorities can extend multifarious sanctions.
A weaker proxy of centralization is the Freedom House (2009) degree of political freedom variable. This
variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling most free and 7 equaling least free.

This is hardly an ideal

measure of centralization, as dened in the model, since it does not directly underscore the ability of the central
authority to impose numerous sanctions.

However, centralized authorities generally also have the ability to

restrict political freedoms. Nowhere do I claim that centralization has to be the driving force behind political
freedom; I merely suggest that this is one way in which centralization manifests itself.

For these reasons,

regressions using this variable are regarded as robustness checks relative to the results employing constraint on
the executive data.
Other controls are employed to account for phenomena which political scientists, economists, and sociologists
consider as salient factors associated with protest activity. These include the urbanization rate, per capita GDP,

42 The religious fractionalization index is constructed

population, and a measure of religious fractionalization.

41 Table A1 shows the protest data broken down by year and Table A3 shows the data broken down by country.
42 Data on urbanization, GDP, and population comes from World Bank (various). The measure of religious fractionalization

is

derived from data found in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001). The controls employed in these regressions are consistent with
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like a Herndahl index, equaling the sum of the proportion of each religion in the country squared. The summary
statistics of all controls are reported in Appendix Table A4.

3.2

Analysis

3.2.1 Testing for the Presence of Protest
The data provide a chance to test the model's primary prediction: countries with centralized political authorities
should have smaller changes (relative to countries with decentralized authorities) in expressed public opinion (as
seen in protests) when shocks are small, but larger changes when shocks are large. Yet, before we can test how
shocks (proxied with IMF variables) aect the severity of protests, we must establish

whether

the proxies are

good predictors of protest. In particular, the model suggests testing the following equation, where
dummy equaling 1 if there is a protest in country

i

in year t,

X

P rotestit

is a

is the set of control variables, and CP denotes

the centralization proxy, where both the constraint on the executive and political freedom variables are
transformed so that higher values indicate greater centralization. Note that regression equation (9) does not
provide a test of the model's hypothesis; instead, it provides a test of how well the IMF variables proxy for a
shock

in the context

of the model.

P rotestit = δ0 + δ1 Shockit + δ2 CPit + δXit + εit .
There are 3 dierent IMF variables that proxy for a shock:
the number of restructurings and reschedulings.

(9)

use of IMF funds, use of EFF funds, and

The rst two variables are deated by the country's IMF

quota, which is based on its standing in the world's economy. Walton and Ragin (1990) note that all three of
these variables are good predictors of austerity protests, with the number of restructurings being the strongest

43 I also create variables for the greatest single-year level of the three IMF proxies over the previous

predictor.

two years.
The model indicates that the coecient on the IMF shock variable,

δ1 , should be positive (and statistically

signicant). If it is not, then the variable in question is not a predictor of protests in general and thus should
shed little light on how institutional centralization aects the

severity

of protests.

44 All regressions

A probit model is used to test equation (9). The probit coecients are reported in Table 2.

those pointed out by Auvinen (1997) as ones that traditionally have received attention in the political science, economics, and
sociology literature related to political conict. Ination and government debt are not included as controls because they frequently

lead

to IMF involvement.

43 Walton

and Ragin formulate an "IMF pressure index" which is the summation of the z-scores of all 4 IMF indicators. I do

not do this for two reasons: 1) I nd, like Walton and Ragin, that the number of restructurings and reschedulings is by far the
best predictor; 2) the sum of the z-scores is dominated by the restructuring variable, which is not normally distributed, and hence
converting it to a z-score is erroneous. I have analyzed the regressions reported in this paper using Walton and Ragin's z-score
variable and the results are similar - though not as strong - as the ones reported here. These results are available upon request.

44 Table

A5 reports regressions where the IMF variables are taken over two years. Results are very similar to Table 2.
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include continent dummies, and standard errors are clustered by continent.

45 The results indicate that the use

of IMF funds and EFF variables are not good predictors of protests, but the restructuring/rescheduling
variable is a good predictor. The coecients on the IMF Pressure Index are statistically insignicant in all of
the regressions where use of IMF funds and EFF variables are employed as the shock proxy and all other
controls are included. However, the number of restructurings or reschedulings appears to be a strong predictor
of protests (the coecient is always positive and highly statistically signicant), a result also found in Walton
and Ragin (1990). Hence, for the remainder of the analysis I only employ reschedulings - not use of IMF funds
or EFF - as a proxy for an IMF "shock".

3.2.2 Relating Centralization and Protest Severity
Since the rescheduling variable is a good predictor of protests, we can re-write Prediction 1 as the following:

Prediction

1A: All else being equal, a change to a more centralized economy should have a positive (negative)

eect on the probability of a more severe protest occurring when the restructuring variable is large (small)

As in the model, Prediction 1A suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between centralization and
the severity of protests. This relationship can be estimated with the regression model in equation (10). The
dependent variable,

P rotestSeverityit ,

equals one if the most severe protest in country

i

and year

t

equals 2

or 3 and equals zero otherwise. Unfortunately, there are too few observations of protests of severity 3 to test

46 This should not

the model using a dependent variable which equals one only if the protest is of severity 3.

detract from the results, however, as the most signicant dierences in protest severity are between those coded
1, which are generally conned and short, and 2 and 3, which are more widespread and long in duration. As
before, CP denotes the centralization proxy (either the constraint on the executive or political rights variable),

47

while the shock variable is the number of reschedulings (over one or two years):

P rotestSeverityit = η0 + η1 Shockit + η2 CPit + η3 Shockit ∗ CPit + ηXit + εit .
45 Including

(10)

country dummies would be ideal, but there is too little variation within countries over time for this to be a feasible

approach, as all results are dependent on a small number of observations. Using non-clustered standard errors gives largely similar
results, which are available upon request.

46 Nevertheless, the results are broadly robust (in terms of statistical
47 There is the possibility that the regressions specied above suer

signicance) to an ordered probit specication.
from an endogeneity problem. That is, it is possible that

more centralized regimes are more (or less) able to access IMF funds and impose austerity.

If this is true, the shock variable

(rescheduling) is a function of the centralization proxy, and the regression model is misspecied. Moreover, Kohlscheen (2010) and
van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) nd a negative relationship between constraints on the executive power (the centralization proxy)
and sovereign debt default (which is related to IMF conditionality). However, the correlations between the shock variables and the
centralization proxies are almost 0. Amongst the observations used in the regressions,
where

RESC

is the rescheduling variable,

CE

σvRESC,CE = −0.0186, σvRESC,P R = −0.0741,

is the Constraint on the Executive variable, and PR is the Political Rights variable.

Moreover, regressions with the rescheduling variables as the dependent variables and the centralization proxies and other controls
on the right-hand side provides highly insignicant results on the centralization proxy coecients. These results are available upon
request.
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Prediction 1A implies that

η2

should be negative and

η3

should be positive. In other words, protest severity

should be decreasing in centralization when shocks are small (and hence the interaction term is small), while
protest severity should be increasing in centralization when shocks are large.

These predictions are mostly

conrmed in Table 3, which reports the probit coecients of an estimation of equation (10).

48

The coecient on the centralization proxies (η2 ) is negative in columns (2)-(4), though it is never statistically
signicant, while the coecient on the interaction term is positive in all regressions and is statistically signicant
in columns (2)-(4). A much more instructive look is provided by Tables 4 and 5, which map the probability
of a severe protest occurring over varying amounts of reschedulings and values of the centralization parameter.
Again, the constraint on the executive has been transformed so that a value of 7 is the most centralized (least
constraint) and the value of 1 is the least centralized (most constraint). These probabilities were derived using
the coecients in Table 3, taken at the average of the control variables.

49

A number of patterns emerge from these tables. First, in the lower panel of Table 4 and in both panels of
Table 5, severe protests are less likely to occur as centralization increases when there are zero reschedulings.
Although the last column suggests that this trend is not statistically signicant, this is in line with what the
model predicts: centralized regimes are more able to suppress dissent when shocks are weak or non-existent. It
is not surprising that this result is not statistically signicant - if there is no evidence of a shock, we would not
expect a severe protest to occur in

any

economy, centralized or not. These comparative statics reverse, however,

when reschedulings occur. In all four panels of Tables 4 and 5, the probability of severe protest is increasing in
centralization when a rescheduling occurs, with the trend being stronger when multiple reschedulings occur. This
trend is statistically signicant in 5 of the 8 specications. This result is consistent with the model: although
centralized regimes are good at suppressing small shocks, they are susceptible to massive changes when larger
shocks occur. Indeed, the probability of a severe protest occurring in the most centralized regimes is more than
double that of the least centralized regimes in 5 of the 8 specications where at least one rescheduling occurs.
In sum, this empirical exercise is meant merely to support the theoretical contribution of the model. Although
the analysis does not speak to the micro mechanisms suggested in the model, it does conrm its testable
predictions. Most importantly, it provides evidence that centralized authorities are able to suppress changes in
publicly-expressed opinion when shocks are small, but are susceptible to massive changes in publicly-expressed
opinion when shocks are large.

48 94

observations are dropped in Table 3 because the Asia dummy perfectly predicts failure (i.e., protest severity =1), and thus

all Asian observations are dropped. The only protest in Asia with severity greater than one, South Korea in 1980, is not included
in the universe of observations because South Korea was never subject to IMF pressure.

49 The

Africa dummy is set equal to 1 and all other continent dummies set equal to 0. The results are robust to setting other

continent dummies equal to 1.
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4

Conclusion

This paper provides insight into why cascades which result in vastly dierent equilibria occur in some institutional settings but not in others. Where the literature discusses the features of a society that can precipitate
a cascade, it primarily focuses on the ability of the government to sanction opposition to the regime (e.g.,
Lohmann 1994; Kuran 1995a, 1995b; Rasler 1996; Yin 1998; Slater 2009; Ellis and Fender 2011).
literature is much less clear on whether it matters

how

Yet, the

political actors sanction opposition. Does it matter if

they can only sanction through military or police force? Are the dynamics any dierent if the regime can impose
religious, social, or economic sanctions?
This paper provides an answer to these questions. It focuses on the degree to which authorities are

centralized

- that is, the degree to which they have the ability to impose sanctions on multiple parts of their subjects' lives.
This paper employs a simple economic model which suggests that authorities in centralized economies are
relatively insulated from small shocks but are susceptible to cascades resulting in massive changes if shocks are
large. The logic underlying this result is straight-forward. People living under centralized authorities are more
likely to choose actions that dier from their intrinsic optima, since they face numerous costs from publicly
stating their true beliefs. Hence, small shocks are unlikely to upset the equilibrium outcome under centralized
rule, because individuals are unwilling to incur the numerous sanctions associated with transgressing the central
authority's dictates. However, a large shock encourages some citizens to incur these costs and publicly display
their anti-authority preferences. Since centralized rule encourages most citizens to falsify their publicly-expressed
preferences, this setting is ripe for these protestors to trigger a cascade which results in a massive equilibrium
change.
In other words, the primary insight of this paper is that the size of the shock necessary to precipitate a
cascade is a

function of the regime type.

This insight sheds light on why cascades arise in some settings but

not in others, even if the shock which ignited the cascade is felt ubiquitously.

For example, small shocks to

the world price of basic goods (e.g., food, oil) can have an impact on elections in decentralized regimes (one
need look no further than the U.S., where the prices of gasoline and groceries are often an issue in national
elections). But such small shocks are unlikely to aect political outcomes in centralized regimes, where rulers can
weather the storm by either increasing subsidies or increasing repression. The opposite is true when suciently
large shocks occur to the price of necessities. Indeed, many of the major austerity riots analyzed in Section 3
followed directly from centralized regimes removing subsidies on basic goods. Similarly large price changes in
decentralized regimes (e.g., U.S. gas prices in the late 1970s) may make many unhappy, but massive rioting is
unlikely to result.
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50 The most promi-

More generally, the model applies to numerous historical and contemporary phenomena.

nent recent example is the Arab Spring of 2011, where citizens who had quietly lived under oppressive, centralized
regimes for decades revolted in massive numbers in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. Goldstone (2011)
notes that the centralization of the sanctioning ability in a Sultan (Goldstone employs the term Sultanistic
governments ) was critical to these movements:  Sultanistic dictators ... generally amass great wealth, which
they use to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish opponents ... Typically, the security forces are separated
into several commands (army, air force, police, intelligence) - each of which reports directly to the leader.
The leader monopolizes contact between the commands, between the military and civilians, and with foreign
governments, a practice that makes sultans essential for both coordinating the security forces and channeling
foreign aid and investment. The multi-lateral coercive power that Goldstone describes in the context of Arab
autocracies is precisely the centralized institutional condition analyzed by the model; and the Arab Spring is
a vivid example of a consequence predicted by the model of such an institutional arrangement.
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Figure 1: Three Equilibria

Table 1: Protests and Severity by Continent
Region
Africa

Mild Protests (1)

Moderate Protests (2)

Massive Protests (3)

Total Protests

9

9

3

21

Asia

10

0

1

11

Central America

25

16

8

1

Europe

7

0

2

9

Middle East

2

2

5

9

South America

17

23

1

41

Total

61

42

13

116

31

Table 2: Protest Presence (Probit Coecients)

Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
Use of Funds/Quota

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.000

0.018

0.021

(0.089)

(0.092)

(0.091)

EFF/Quota

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.075***

0.037

0.033

(0.027)

(0.036)

(0.037)

# of reschedulings/
restructurings
Constraint on

-0.020

Executive

Urbanization Rate
Log of Real GDP
Religious

(8)

(9)

0.389***

0.304***

0.303***

(0.099)

(0.108)

(0.110)

-0.020

(0.023)

Political Rights

(7)

-0.022

(0.023)

(0.024)

-0.041**

-0.037

-0.041

(0.018)

(0.024)

(0.025)

0.913

0.877

0.870

0.838

0.698

0.656

(1.153)

(1.134)

(1.154)

(1.138)

(1.025)

(1.000)

-0.188

-0.193

-0.180

-0.184

-0.180

-0.183

(0.128)

(0.141)

(0.122)

(0.137)

(0.111)

(0.126)

0.656

0.630

0.648

0.622

0.600

0.568

(0.640)

(0.644)

(0.670)

(0.672)

(0.645)

(0.654)

0.195**

0.193**

0.190**

0.188**

0.188**

0.185**

(0.087)

(0.085)

(0.084)

(0.082)

(0.086)

(0.084)

Number of

0.038**

0.039**

0.039**

0.040**

0.044**

0.046***

Previous Protests

(0.018)

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.016)

(0.018)

(0.017)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Fractionalization
Log of Population

Continent Dummies
Observations
pseudo R-squared

No

No

No

805

801

801

807

803

803

807

803

803

0.000

0.108

0.109

0.006

0.109

0.110

0.026

0.122

0.123

Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each regression
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Table 3: Presence of Severe Protest (Probit Coecients)

Dependent Variable: Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
# of reschedulings
Constraint on Executive
# of reschedulings*
Constraint on Executive

(1)

(2)

0.099

0.007

(0.148)

(0.115)

(3)

0.032

-0.033

(0.035)

(0.041)

0.024
(0.050)

Political Rights
# of reschedulings*

-0.023

-0.056

(0.053)

(0.052)

0.048*

Political Rights

(0.027)

# of reschedulings (over 2 years)

-0.246

-0.093

(0.152)

(0.076)

# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*

0.085**

Constraint on Executive

(0.035)

# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*

0.061**

Political Rights
Urbanization Rate
Log of Real GDP
Religious Fractionalization
Log of Population
Number of Previous Protests

(0.024)
0.959

1.013

1.032

1.065

(0.649)

(0.778)

(0.809)

(0.857)

-0.294*

-0.323*

-0.312*

-0.341*

(0.150)

(0.168)

(0.167)

(0.179)

0.740

0.754

0.760

0.741

(0.587)

(0.581)

(0.543)

(0.523)

0.183

0.195

0.191

0.198

(0.138)

(0.130)

(0.134)

(0.127)

0.029

0.017

0.017

0.014

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.036)

(0.032)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Continent Dummies
Observations
pseudo R-squared

(4)

705

705

690

690

0.124

0.122

0.123

0.118

Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each regression

33

Table 4: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels

Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Constraint on
Executive =
# of reschedulings = 0
# of reschedulings = 1
# of reschedulings = 2

# of reschedulings = 0
(over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
(over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
(over 2 years)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.023***

0.024***

0.026***

0.028***

0.030***

0.033***

0.035***

[0.004]

[0.003]

[0.003]

[0.004]

[0.006]

[0.009]

[0.012]

0.030***

0.034***

0.039***

0.043***

0.049***

0.055***

0.061***

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.006]

[0.007]

[0.008]

[0.010]

0.040***

0.047***

0.055***

0.065***

0.076***

0.088**

0.101*

[0.015]

[0.013]

[0.014]

[0.019]

[0.028]

[0.040]

[0.055]

0.040***

0.037***

0.035***

0.032***

0.030***

0.028***

0.026***

[0.012]

[0.008]

[0.005]

[0.003]

[0.003]

[0.005]

[0.007]

0.028***

0.032***

0.035***

0.040***

0.044***

0.049***

0.055***

[0.003]

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.003]

[0.003]

[0.004]

[0.004]

0.019***

0.026***

0.036***

0.048***

0.064***

0.083***

0.106***

[0.005]

[0.006]

[0.006]

[0.008]

[0.011]

[0.016]

[0.023]

H0 :

(1) = (7)

(p-value)
0.409
0.004
0.317

0.438
0.000
0.000

Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 1 of Table 3 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 3 of Table 3

Table 5: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels

Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Political Rights =
# of reschedulings = 0
# of reschedulings = 1
# of reschedulings = 2

# of reschedulings = 0
(over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
(over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
(over 2 years)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.037**

0.035***

0.034***

0.032***

0.030***

0.029***

0.027***

[0.017]

[0.012]

[0.009]

[0.006]

[0.005]

[0.007]

[0.009]

0.042***

0.044***

0.047***

0.049***

0.052***

0.055***

0.058***

[0.015]

[0.013]

[0.011]

[0.009]

[0.008]

[0.007]

[0.008]

0.047**

0.055***

0.064***

0.073***

0.084***

0.096***

0.109***

[0.019]

[0.021]

[0.023]

[0.026]

[0.030]

[0.034]

[0.040]

0.048**

0.042***

0.038***

0.033***

0.029***

0.026***

0.023***

[0.020]

[0.013]

[0.008]

[0.005]

[0.004]

[0.006]

[0.008]

0.045***

0.045***

0.046***

0.046***

0.046***

0.047***

0.047***

[0.015]

[0.012]

[0.009]

[0.006]

[0.004]

[0.004]

[0.006]

0.042***

0.048***

0.055***

0.062***

0.071***

0.080***

0.090***

[0.012]

[0.012]

[0.012]

[0.012]

[0.014]

[0.016]

[0.020]

H0 :

(1) = (7)

(p-value)
0.679
0.367
0.025

0.327
0.887
0.021

Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 2 of Table 3 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 4 of Table 3

34

